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Voluntary Assumption of Risk. Francis H. Bohlen. Mr. Bohlen
probably gives us the keynote of the theory which he is here presenting
to us, when he says: "The maxim Volenti non fit injuria is a terse
expression of the individualistic tendency of the common law, which
proceeding from the people and asserting their liberties, naturally
regards the freedom of individual action as the keystone of the whole
structure." We are shown that in the early law there was little disposition
to do more than afford to a person the chance to protect himself from
injury; to make known to him the danger already known to another;
there was no disposition to protect him when he was supposed to be in
a position where the danger was known to him and he might protect
himself. We are shown how the theory of the voluntary assumption
of risk arose, and given a line of cases where "the voluntary encountering of a perfectly well-known and appreciated danger had been held
not to involve an assumption of the risk of the resultant injury," and
these are considered to be referable to the same general principle,
"that one who has a legal right or legal or social duty to act as he has
done under the conditions created by the defendant's wrong does not
act voluntarily, his action is caused by the coercion of the circumstances
which the defendant's wrong has created." The term "coercion of
circumstances" will perhaps bear a wider significance than Mr. Bohlen
has given it. Have not industrial conditions so changed as to make
that coercion a practical slavery? The individual who was free to
take up a certain employment and, finding it to be conducted in a dangerous manner, could leave it and find employment with another and a better master, has been almost eliminated from the industrial life of
to-day. The workman lives in a manufacturing town where the one
great industry is that by which he is employed. The conditions are
dangerous. Every day one life or more is added to the list of victims who saw the danger and accepted it. Accepted it because to
refuse meant the loss, not of employment in any particular shop or
with any particular employer, but the total loss of all employment either
there or elsewhere. Has such a man any choice? Can the alternative
of working under conditions known to be excessively dangerous or of
starving be considered a choice? Is he not bound by the "coercion of
circumstances" to that labor? When the man dies from the accepted
danger, who pays for the economic loss? Who supports the helpless
children? The public, which thereby pays a debt it dbes not owe to a
person or a corporation who by the aid of the courts has been freed
from all responsibility. It is claimed that the cause of this theory as
promulgated by the courts was the "intolerable and almost prohibitive
burden upon the development of business and manufacture" the
recognition of the master's liability for injury by a servant to his
fellow-servant would impose upon such business or manufacture. It
was felt that "commercial necessity" required it. The question to-day
is, Was that feeling justified, and have the results been satisfactory?
The Congress of the United States in their last session answered the
question in the negative.
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This is but the first instalment of Mr. Bohlen's paper, so that his
own theory in regard to the matter is left to be more fully developed
in the next number.
Harvard Law Review, November, pp. 13-24.
CORPORATIONS.

Lawyers and Corporate Capitalization. Edward M. Shepard. The
loss by the Bar of its former position in popular esteem is first noted by
Mr. Shepard, and the cause of this loss is then sought for. This cause
seems to be found in the "vastly increased representation of corporate
interests," by the legal fraternity. The people have learned to distrust
the corporations and they have learned to associate the corporations
with the lawyer who represents their interests whenever they come
before the public. Mr. Shepard then considers the legal requirement
of specific capitalization in the incorporation of companies, and the
injury this requirement does corporations in public esteem. "I propose for your consideration whether it may not be wise to abolish
altogether our requirement of a charter or technical capitalization of
corporations." He would permit the creation by a company of as
many shares of its capital stock as it sees fit, but he would not have
the law require any par value for the shares. He states that this
requirement that the total capitalization be prescribed, the number of
shares into which it is to be divided and the par value of each share,
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think, count it certain that the justifiable
ignorant hostility and suspicion from which lawyers suffer will disappear. They will again take their fit share in public life with its
burdens and its honors. This noble profession of ours will hold in
the public service and esteem a rank at least as high as that it held
until the American people justly became indignant at corporate abuses."
Green Bag, November, pp. 6oi-6x3.
YEAR BooKs.

The Year Books. W. S. Holdsworth. The second of the articles
upon the Year Books proves quite as valuable and interesting as the
first of the series. Mr. Holdsworth takes up the "differences between
the medimval and the modern in such vital matters as the rules of
process and the rules of pleading,' in order to see how far such an
examination will "place us at the right point of view from which to
look at the Year Books." He first shows that at the early period at which
the Year Books begin the law was only just emerging from that
primitive stage in which it was difficult to secure the apliearance of the
defendant, and the difficulties of travel still made process slow. The
machinery was slow and cumbersome as the means of travel, and the
rules of law were fixed before they became rational. It may be that
some of the cases Mr. Holdsworth thinks "not very intelligible"
would prove on a closer examination by a student of the branch of the
law under which the case came, less ambiguous. For many years Year
Book law was held in contempt as a whole, as being too archaic for

